Conciencia medioambiental e impuestos a la contaminación en presencia de competencia oligopolística

Desarrollamos un modelo oligopolístico en el que dos empresas competidoras producen un bien homogéneo, pero los consumidores tienen preferencias diferentes por ellas. Un bien es producido por una tecnología contaminante y el otro es producido por tecnología no contaminante. El gobierno anfitrión establece un impuesto de contaminación para la empresa contaminante. El impuesto de contaminación es positivo si la desutilidad de la contaminación marginal y/o el nivel de conciencia medioambiental son lo suficientemente grandes. El impuesto óptimo de contaminación es nulo si la desutilidad de la contaminación marginal y/o el nivel de conciencia medioambiental son lo suficientemente pequeños.

conciencia medioambiental, impuesto de contaminación, competencia oligopolística, desutilidad por contaminar

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