Reciprocal Dumping and Environmental Polices

En un modelo de comercio con dumping recíproco se analizan los efectos sobre el bienestar de una reforma de política ambiental, en un contexto de desempleo y repatriación de beneficios. Las cuotas de contaminación, determinadas por el gobierno de cada país, restringen la producción local y reducen el daño social de la contaminación. Sin embargo, la cuota es una barrera comercial que inhibe el empleo y reduce el excedente de los consumidores. Teniendo presente tales aspectos, los países acuerdan una disminución uniforme de la cuota de contaminación, de manera infinitesimal y proporcionada. En ambos casos, el bienestar global se incrementará si la desutilidad marginal de la contaminación es mayor que el costo de reducirla. El efecto en cada país dependerá del tamaño del mercado y de los costos tecnológicos marginales. Bajo las mismas condiciones, cuando los países acuerdan armonizar sus cuotas de contaminación, el bienestar global se incrementará, pero el efecto sobre el bienestar de cada país será diferente.

Ambiente, contaminación, permisos de emisión, Inversión Extranjera Directa

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