An Approach to the Impact of Corruption in the Developing Economies and Its Competitiveness
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En aquellos países donde el gobierno tolera o abiertamente favorece las donaciones y regalos por parte de empresas privadas, las empresas multinacionales son más propensas que sus contrapartes locales a participar en formas corruptas de influenciar las decisiones políticas. Diferentes tipos de empresas extranjeras se involucran en formas particulares de corrupción, dependiendo del tipo específico de ventaja comparativa que esperen obtener. Las multinacionales de mayor tamaño, con oficinas centrales en el extranjero, son menos propensas a otorgar donativos o a dar regalos, pero son mucho más asiduas a la corrupción de políticas y al soborno. Y aunque las empresas multinacionales argumenten que son sometidas a mayor presión para el soborno, no existe evidencia sobre un mayor pago en comparación con sus contrapartes locales, aunque es más frecuente que se vean involucradas en este tipo de prácticas.
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