El monopolio en un entorno competitivo
Abstract
Un mercado de producción con preferencias dadas, tecnología y tecnología de competencia es vulnerable si admite tanto la competencia perfecta como el monopolio u oligopolio. Con los rendimientos decrecientes, los costos irrecuperables combinados con un potencial de ganancias monopolísticas proporcionan una base suficiente para la vulnerabilidad. Un gran agente puede establecer un monopolio instalando suficiente capacidad productiva. El monopolista disuade la entrada al amenazar con abastecer excesivamente al mercado. La amenaza es creíble si la tasa de descuento futura es lo suficientemente baja y si suficientes jugadores pequeños ingresan al mercado en ausencia del castigo. Las instituciones financieras pueden capturar mercados vulnerables con fines de lucro, reduciendo la competencia, eficiencia y equidad.
Keywords
Monopolio, mercados competitivos, tecnología de competencia
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