Reciprocal dumping and environmental taxes
Abstract
This paper calculates the optimal tax of the emission ot polluting agents in oligopolistic possess and under conditions of the reciprocal dumping, in which the firms count on the appropriate technology to decrease the pollution and can decide the amount of emissions generated. In this model the optimal tax mainly depends on the amount of the marginal disutility to pollute, as well as the abatement cost.
Keywords
reciprocal dumping, taxes, environment policy, oligopolistic competition
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