Gobierno corporativo y reemplazo de presidentes de los consejos de administración en México

El presente trabajo estudia la repercusión de cuatro variables de Gobierno Corporativo sobre la probabilidad de reemplazo de Presidentes de los Consejos de Administración en México. Las variables que se analizan son: vínculos familiares, vínculos empresariales, vínculos políticos y tamaño de la Junta de Directores. Las conclusiones a las que se llegan difieren, en general, del resto de la literatura revisada. Esto se atribuye a que la realidad empresarial mexicana es distinta a la observada en muchos otros países, por lo que la teoría de agencias no aplica en este caso.

Reemplazos, Gobierno Corporativo, Junta Directiva, teoría de agencias

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