Vol. 18 Núm. 38 (2023)

Artículos

Una ilustración de la política monetaria en el modelo neokeynesiano simple de expectativas racionales

Publicado 02-01-2023

  • Eddy Lizarazu
    • ,
  • Samuel Lizarazu

Eddy Lizarazu
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa

Samuel Lizarazu


Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo es comprobar que una política monetaria de compromiso es superior a una política monetaria discrecional. En el modelo neokeynesiano simple de expectativas racionales esta supremacía es revelada de dos maneras. En primer lugar, la solución de expectativas racionales de la política de compromiso entraña ciertas ventajas sobre la política discrecional. En segundo lugar, las simulaciones numéricas del modelo neokeynesiano con una perspectiva de compromiso aseguran mejores resultados que con una política discrecional.

Palabras clave

Descomposición de Schur, expectativas racionales, función impulso-respuesta, modelo neokeynesiano, política monetaria óptima

PDF

Referencias

  1. Blanchard, O.J. & C.M. Khan (1980). The solution of linear difference models under rational expectations. Econometrica, 48(5):1305-1311. https://doi.org/10.2307%2F1912186.
  2. Calvo, G. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12(3): 383-398. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90060-0.
  3. Clarida, R., Galí. J. & M. Gertler (1999). The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 37:1661-1707. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.4.1661.
  4. Dennis, R. (2010). When is discretion superior to time less perspective policy making? Journal of Monetary Economics. 57(3): 66-277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.02.006.
  5. Eser, F.; P. Karadi; P.R. Lane; L. Moretti & C. Osbat (2022). The Phillips Curve at the ECB. Working Paper Series, No. 2400, European Central Bank, Eurosystem. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2400~6e8bfb6fd2.en.pdf.
  6. Gali, J. (2008). Monetary policy, inflation, and the business cycle: An introduction to the New Keynesian framework, United Kingdom: Princeton University Press.
  7. Jensen, C. (2020). Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics. 20:1 20180035. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejm-2018-0035.
  8. Klein, P. (2000). Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear rational expectations model. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 24:1405-1423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00045-7.
  9. Liu, D., Zhang, Y. & W. Sun (2020). Commitment or discretion? An empirical investigation of monetary policy preferences in China. Economic Modelling, 85: 409-419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.022.
  10. McCallum, B.T. (1983). On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models: An attempt at perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics, 11-2:139-168. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90028-4.
  11. McCallum, B.T. & E. Nelson (2004). Timeless Perspective vs. Discretionary Monetary Policy in Forward-Looking Models. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March-April: 43-56. https://doi.org/10.20955/r.86.43-56.
  12. Rotemberg, J. J. (1982). Monopolistic price adjustment and aggregate output. The Review of Economic Studies, 49-4: 517–531. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297284.
  13. Sauer, S. (2007). Discretion rather than rules? When is discretionary policymaking better than the timeless perspective. International Journal of Central Banking, June:1-29.
  14. Sauter, O. (2014). Monetary Policy under Uncertainty: Historical Origins, Theoretical Foundations, and Empirical Evidence, Stuttgart: Springer Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04974-4.
  15. Söderlind, P. (1999). Solution and estimation of rational expectations macromodels with optimal policy. European Economic Review, 41:1111–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00096-8.
  16. Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39:195-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(93)90009-L.
  17. Walsh, C.E. (2000). Monetary policy design: Institutional developments from a contractual perspective. International Finance, 3-3:375-89. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2362.00057.
  18. ___ (2010). Monetary Policy and Theory, 3rd Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  19. Woodford, M. (1999). Optimal monetary policy inertia. The Manchester School Supplement, 67-S1: 1-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.67.s1.1
  20. ___ (2001). The Taylor rule and optimal monetary policy. The American Economic Review, 91(2): 232-237. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.232
  21. ___ (2003). Interest & Prices, Princeton: Princeton University Press.