Vol. 13 No. 25 (2017)

Artículos

Electronic invoice: asynchronous innovation

Published 2017-07-03

  • Hugo J . Fuentes Castro
    • ,
  • Grisel Ayllón Aragón

Hugo J . Fuentes Castro
Profesor-investigador del Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México.

Grisel Ayllón Aragón
Profesora del Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México.

Abstract

The electronic bill was introduced in Mexico to fight against tax evasion. In this paper, we show how the digital gap which exists in Mexico avoids the proper use of the electronic bill and becomes an obstacle for the formalization of enterprises. Hence, we observe asynchrony between the electronic tool imposed by a public policy and the technologic and institutional environment in which it is used. It is evident the need of a fiscal policy adequate for the Mexican micro and median firms. We proof this through a principal-agent model.

Keywords

electronic bill, incentives, moral hazard

PDF (Spanish)

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