Vol. 11 No. 21 (2015)

Artículos

Institutions, classical economics and evolutionary economics

Published 2015-07-06

  • EIvio Accinelli

EIvio Accinelli
Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Facultad de Economía de la UASLP

Abstract

In this paper considerations about evolutionary theory and its possibilities to complement the classical theory of profit maximization are offered. Specifically, imitation is shown as an alternative to classical optimization when there bounded rationality. The evolution of corrupt behavior is analyzed in a society of individuals maximizing their welfare but must make decisions under conditions of imperfect information.

Keywords

evolutionary economics, replicator dynamics, institutions, corruption

PDF (Spanish)

References

  1. Accinelli, E. (2010). “Evolución y crisis en un modelo de equilibrio general”, Documento de trabajo 09. Departamento de Economía de la Facultad de Ciencias Socia- les, Universidad de la República. ISSN:0797-7484.
  2. Accinelli, E.; S. London, L. Punzo y E. Carrera, “Complementarities Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in the Populations of Firms and Workers”. Journal of Economics and Econometrics, vol 53, No. 1, pp. 90-110.
  3. Accinelli, E.; B. Bazzano, F. Robledo y P, Romero (2015). “Nash Equilibrium in Evolutionary Competitive Models of firms and workers”, vol. 2, No. 1 Journal of Dynamics and Games, pp. 1-32.
  4. Accinelli, E. y E. Carera “Corruption driven by imitative behavior”, Economics Letters vol. 117, Mayo 2012, pp. 84-87.
  5. Accinelli, E.; E. Carrera y L. Policardo, “On the dynamics and effects of corruption on environmental proteccion”. Modelling, Optimization and BioEconomics, editors Alberto Pinto (INESC-TEC, University of Porto, Portugal) Marcelo Viana (IMPA, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Series: Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics, vol. 73 Ch. 3, june 2014, pp. 85-120.
  6. Aumann R. J. y S. Hart (1994). The theory of general economic equilibrium: A differentiable aproach. Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 929-993.
  7. Foundations of the theory General Equilibrium (1988). Academ. Press, pp. 929-993.
  8. Debreu, G. (1983). Mathematical Economics. Econometric Society Monographs. Cam- bridge University Press, pp. 230-275.
  9. Mantel, R. (1974). “On the characterization of aggregate excessdemand”. Journal of Economic Theory. 7: pp. 348-353.
  10. Maynard Smith, J. y J.R. Price (1973). “The logic of conflict animal”, Nature, 246: 15-18 Sanditov, B. (2006). “Essays on Social Learning and Imitation”, Ph.D. thesis, Maas- trictht University, pp. 145-197.
  11. Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary game theory, MIT Press, pp. 190-230.